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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE SELECTION
OF DELEGATES TO NATIONAL POLITICAL
CONVENTIONS
It is disconcerting that the professional politicians who run our
two national parties often seem to be more concerned with maintaining
control of their parties than with winning control of the government.1
So it was that Goldwater's "organizational strength" won him the 1964
Republican nomination despite his consistently poor showing in the
primaries and opinion polls.2 Likewise, in 1968, McCarthy supporters
within the Democratic Party often found their efforts to secure delegate
representation futile.3
Faced with what many viewed as a meaningless choice of presiden-
tial candidates in 1968,4 some Democrats sought to reform the nomina-
tion procedure within their party.5 Twenty challenges were filed with
the Credentials Committee of the 1968 Democratic National Conven-
tion; fifteen were argued before the Committee, and five were brought
before the Convention through minority reports.6 Although all chal-
lenges based on undemocratic delegate selection or constitutional viola-
tion failed,7 the reformers made their point: the Convention adopted a
I A. BICKEL, THE NEW AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE
CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSrEm 25 (1968); cf. Note, The Presidential Nomination:
Equal Protection at the Grass Roots, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 175 (1969). The more con-
ventional theory of the structural-functionalists is that the professionals will always
choose the most popular candidate because they seek the rewards of electoral victory. Cf.
David, Reforming the Presidential Nominating Process, 27 LAw & Cowrmp. PRoB. 159,
169-70 (1962).
2 David, Introduction to NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING
PROCEDURES IN 1964, at 4-5 (1965).
3 In Pennsylvania's 1968 presidential preference primary, for example, McCarthy
received 71.6% of the total Democratic vote; however, the at-large delegates appointed by
the Democratic State Committee included almost no McCarthy supporters, and he re-
ceived only 21!/ of the state's 130 delegate votes (under 17%) at the Convention. 26
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2242, 2244 (1968). See also Schmidt & Whalen, Credentials Contests at
the 1968-and 1972-Democratic National Conventions, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1438, 1454-55
(1969); Note, supra note 1, at 176.
4 See Note, Regulation of Political Parties: Vote Dilution in the Presidential Nomina-
tion Procedure, 54 IOWA L. REV. 471 (1968).
5 The legal issues discussed herein apply with equal force to any political party;
however, they have not yet arisen within the Republican Party. See A. BICKEL, supra
note 1, at 34, 37.
6 This was the greatest number of challenges in party history. Schmidt & Whalen,
supra note 3, at 1438-39. See also T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968, at
278 (1969).
7 Only challenges based on racial discrimination in violation of the Call to the 1968
Convention were successful. Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 3, at 1438-54.
DELEGATE SELECTION
minority report of the Rules Committee aimed at democratizing s dele-
gate selection for future conventions. It directs that the Call to the 1972
Convention require that
[a]ll feasible efforts [be] made to assure that delegates are selected
through party primary, convention, or committee procedures open
to public participation within the calendar year of the National
Convention.9
The majority report of the Credentials Committee, also adopted
by the Convention, called for "appropriate revisions in the delegate
selection process to assure the fullest possible participation and to make
the Democratic Party completely representative of grass-root senti-
ment."10 Pursuant to a recommendation of this report, the Democratic
National Chairman has established a Commission on Party Structure
and Delegate Selectiorn to assist the state parties in conforming with the
Call to the 1972 Democratic National Convention. 1 The Commission
has adopted guidelines for interpreting the language in the minority
report, which in effect establish a defense for non-compliance with
the democratization procedures when compliance is impossible under
existing state law.12
8 [O]ne was slowly overwhelmed by the sense of the grotesquely obsolete. More
than 600 delegates to this convention had been chosen by processes begun over
two years before. In three states, one man alone could appoint all, or most, of the
delegates to a national convention. . . . In other states, many or all delegates
were appointed by the Party's executive committee, whose members were them-
selves chosen by processes incomprehensible to any but seasoned full-time poli-
ticians. In yet other states, delegates were chosen by unofficial caucuses meeting
at obscure halls, schools or private homes where extremists and activists, pro-
claiming themselves Republicans or Democrats, could raid and dominate the
grass roots selection process in either party.
T. WHrrE, supra note 6, at 274.
9 The Origins, Mandate and Guidelines of the Commission on Party Structure and
Delegate Selection 2 (undated memorandum published by the Democratic Party Com-
mission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection) [hereinafter cited as Comm'n Memo-
randum]. The minority report also provided that "the unit rule not be used in any stage
of the delegate selection process ...." Id. See A. Bicx.L, supra note 1, at 28-29; T. WHrrE,
supra note 6, at 273-75; Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 3, at 1455-56.
10 Comm'n Memorandum 1. See Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 3, at 1455.
11 Comm'n Memorandum 1. Whether the national party could compel the state party
to change its rules is an interesting legal question. In State ex rel. Cook v. Hanser, 122 Wis.
534, 100 N.V. 964 (1904), it was held that the national convention was not the supreme
authority within the state party. Contra, State ex rel. Nebraska Republican State Cent.
Comm. v. Wait, 92 Neb. 313, 138 N.W. 159 (1912). See also Starr, The Legal Status of
American Political Parties, 1, 34 Aia. POL. Scr. REv. 439, 450 (1940). Whatever the law,
the national convention's power to judge the qualifications of delegates thereto has ap-
parently never been challenged, so the party has the means to enforce its rules on dele-
gate selection.
12 The guidelines read as follows:
Recognizing that even the most vigorous and timely effort by the state and na-
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The requirement of "all feasible efforts" in the 1972 Call, however,
should be interpreted to include a judicial challenge to undemocratic
state laws.' 3 Such challenges have already been made under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, but they have proved
unsuccessful.1 Recent Supreme Court decisions on freedom of associa-
tion, on the other hand, indicate that an attack rooted in that first
amendment right would enable a political party to democratize the
delegate selection process,
THE FAILURE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Insurgents within the Democratic Party in 1968 sought judicial
assistance in their efforts to reform the nomination procedure even be-
fore the National Convention met. Both Smith v. State Executive Cor-
tional party might fail in this situation, it was agreed that a delegation should
be allowed to prove to the Credentials Committee that Republican control of
the legislature made compliance impossible. The language "all feasible efforts"
was accepted by the group to meet this problem after its proponents clarified
two points: 1) the exception would be applicable only where the opposition
party controlled the legislature at all times during which it might be reasonably
possible to pas a new law going into effect in 1972 or before; and 2) a delega-
tion establishing impossibility on this ground would also be obliged to show that
it had held hearings, introduced bills and lobbied for their enactment, and that
its state party rules had been amended in every necessary way, short of exposing
the party or its members to legal sanctions,
Comm'n Memorandum 4.
13 No implication that the reforms of the 1968 Convention are meaningless without
a challenge to these state laws is intended. Some state laws on delegate selection provide
for an exercise of discretion in the state party to avoid the most undemocratic provisions.
E.g., N.Y. ELEcION LAw § 21 (McKinney 1964); PA, STAT. tit. 25, §§ 2838-39 (1936). (Both
provide for election of district delegates in primaries during the convention year and
for appointment of at-large delegates by the state committee, elected two years before,
but neither require that there be any at-large delegates.) Under these conditions, the
guidelines presumably require that the most democratic method available be used, How-
ever, even the most democratic method of selection available under New York law, the
district primary, does not allow delegate candidates to indicate their presidential candi-
date preference on the ballot. See N.Y. ELEaroN LAw § 108 (McKinney 1964) (form of
ballot). Furthermore, state legislators are among the professional politicians who now
control national conventions and are not likely to voluntarily diminish their own power.
Thus, providing any defense to credentials challenges based on undemocratic state laws
without requiring judicial challenge will probably discourage reform. See Schmidt &
Whalen, supra note 3, at 1457-58,
14 Despite its rejection by the courts, two recent law review notes have continued
to advocate this approach. Note, supra note 4; Note, The Presidential Nomination; Equal
Protection at the Grass Roots, 42 S. CAL. L. Rav. 169 (1969). But seo Note, One Man,
One Vote and Selection of Delegates to National Nominating Conventions, 37 U. Cm. L.
Rrv. 536 (1970).
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mittee of the Democratic Party!5 and Irish v. DemocraticFarmer.Labor
Party16 attacked the delegate selection process under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.17 The petitioners com-
bined the "one person, one vote" standard of the apportionment cases' 8
with the concept of state action in the white primary cases's and con,
tended that the courts should ensure that the opinions of all party
members be given equal weight in the nomination process.
Both of these efforts failed. The Smith court pointed out that the
only decision going deeper into the affairs of a political party than the
primary election, Terry v. Adams,20 was decided under the fifteenth
amendment,21 and then concluded that even if an equal protection
claim were in order it would fail since all party members could partic
ipate in the state party convention held two years before the National
Convention. The state convention, the court noted, could control the
state central committee which, as the depository of the "sole legal power
in party affairs," could control the selection of delegates.22 In theory,
then, there was no denial of equal protection, even though delegate
selection ws in fact made by the state chairman with the consent of
the gubernatorial nominee. In Irish, the court distinguished the cases
dealing with racial discrimination, discussed the "almost insurmount-
able problem with respect to remedy," and concluded that the case
presented "a non-justiciable political question." 23
Despite the tenuousness of the equal protection formulation in
Smith and the avoidance of the real issue in Irish, the desire of the
courts to avoid the questions raised is understandable. What, for ex-
ample, is the method of delegate selection required by equal protec-
tion?24 How are delegates to be apportioned?25 These are only some of
15 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
16 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
17 There were at least two other actions begun besides those mentioned in the text.
One, involving the Washington State Democratic Committee, was apparently dropped
before trial. Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 3, at 1446 n.32. In addition, a key vote by the
Missouri delegation at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in favor of democratiz-
ing the delegate selection process for future conventions was apparently arranged when
McCarthy supporters in that state abandoned a lawsuit attacking the use of the unit rule.
Id. at 1456 n.83.
18 E.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
19 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
20 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
21 288 F. Supp. at 376.
22 Id. at 377.
23 399 F.2d at 120-21.
24 Some of the alternatives include precinct caucuses, district conventions, state con-
ventions, and district or state-wide primaries.
25 Possible methods of apportionment are population, party enrollment, and votes
1970]
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the problems the courts would face if they chose to rewrite the rules
of presidential politics with the equal protection clause.2 6
Furthermore, the distinctions drawn by the courts between dele-
gate selection reform and the white primary cases27 are valid. Through
the medium of those cases the Supreme Court made it clear that the
Constitution prohibits a political party from denying membership to
an individual on the basis of race. At issue was the concept of state
action rather than the definition of equal protection, and nowhere do
the cases define the extent to which the party may otherwise condition
membership or regulate its internal affairs without being subject to
judicial scrutiny. The answers to these questions depend on the ap-
plicability of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the affairs of political parties, and they are not to be found in the
white primary cases.28
II
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND POLITICAL PARTIES
It has frequently been observed that the Constitution contains no
specific protection of freedom of political association and that the
Founding Fathers viewed political parties with distrust.29 To ground
this freedom constitutionally, however, one need only recall that this
nation was born in the activities of political associations such as the
received by party candidates in previous elections. It would also be uncertain whether
uniform methods were required in all parties and in all states.
26 Add to the lack of standards the requests for judicial substitution of one set of
delegates for another on the very eve of a convention, and the results in Smith and Irish
become predictable. Cf. Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 3, at 1449 & nn.46 & 49.
Lack of standards has led some advocates of the equal protection approach to nom-
ination reform to argue for a host of state and federal laws establishing standards. E.g.,
Note, supra note 4, at 482-95. They concede that the passage of such legislation is un-
likely, but then seem to ignore the problem that the courts will have to establish stan-
dards if equal protection is to yield any results. Id. at 496.
27 Cases cited in note 19 supra.
28 The determination of whether equal protection will apply to the internal affairs
of a political party may depend on how successful the parties are at reforming them-
selves: "I would not consider intervention by this Court into so delicate a field if there
were any other relief available to the people ..... Baker v. Carr, 569 U.S. 186, 258
(1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
29 State ex rel. Shepard v. Superior Court, 60 Wash. 370, 882, 111 P. 233, 238 (1910)
("Political parties being neither mentioned, protected, nor favored in the constitution
.... .'); G. ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASsEMBLY AND AssoctATIoN 191 (1961); D. FELL-
MAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSoCIATION 38 (1963); Mitau, Judicial Determina-
tion of Political Party Organizational Autonomy, 42 MINN. L. REv. 245 (1957). For a
[Vol. 56:148
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Sons of Liberty and the Committees of Correspondence." Although
Madison, the principal author of the Bill of Rights, condemned the
spirit of "faction" in The Federalist No. 10, he concluded that it could
not be eliminated without destroying liberty.31 In 1794, when Congress
sought to condemn the forerunners of modem political parties for
organizing the Whiskey Rebellion, Madison led the successful opposi-
tion, arguing that regulation of political associations was beyond Con-
gress's power.3 2
Noting this background, courts early proclaimed the inviolability
of an individual's rights to organize, join, and manage a political
party.33 Some courts found these rights to be corollaries of the right of
suffrage, 34 while others found them inherent in the constitutional
rights of assembly and petition.35 Still others viewed these rights as
basic to a free people.3 6 A few courts even adopted the position that
political parties had certain inherent and inviolable rights separate and
distinct from their members.37
The preferred position of political parties in the law was so firmly
established by the end of the nineteenth century that state attempts
to establish a mandatory party structure or an open nominating pro-
cedure were regularly struck down as invasions of the party's right to
regulate its internal affairs.38 During the progressive era, however, legis-
lative pressure for reform of political parties mounted, and the courts
began to focus on the reasonableness of regulations.39 Soon thereafter,
thorough, if somewhat outdated, compilation of state constitutional provisions dealing
with political parties, see Starr, supra note 11, at 441-42.
30 Schlesinger, Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 Am. Hisr. REV. 1, 4-5 (1944).
31 THE FEDmLIST No. 10, at 105-06 (J. Hamilton ed. 1865) (J. Madison).
82 See R. HoRN, GRouPs AND THE CONsrIU ON 17-18 (1956); E. LINK, DEMOCRATIC-
REB uICAN Socm=rs, 1790-1800, at 205 (1942).
33 G. AiERNATHY, supra note 29, at 173, 191; D. FErLMAN, supra note 29, at 38-39;
C. RicE, FREEDOm oF AssOCIATION 100-01 (1962); Rice, The Constitutional Right of Asso-
ciation, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 491, 500 (1965); Starr, supra note 11, at 444-45.
The chronological inconsistency between the historical outline presented in the text
accompanying notes 34-41 infra and the case dates may be explained by noting that
courts of different states were at similar phases of historical development at different
times.
84 See, e.g., Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble, 210 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270 (1929); Ex parte
Wilson, 7 Okla. Crim. 610, 125 P. 739 (1912); State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1,
128 N.W. 1041 (1910).
35 See, e.g., Britton v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900);
Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 P. 444 (1910).
36 See, e.g., Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 92 N.W. 93 (1902).
37 See, e.g., Whipple v. Broad, 25 Colo. 407, 55 P. 172 (1898). See also Friedman,
Reflections upon the Law of Political Parties, 44 CALIF. L. Rrv. 65, 65-68 (1956).
88 E.g., Britton v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900).
39 E.g., State ex rel. Plimmer v. Poston, 58 Ohio St. 620, 51 N.E. 150 (1898). (require-
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confronted by evidence of widespread political corruption, they capit-
ulated and allowed almost any statutory regulation in the interest of
"purifying" the electoral process.40 Today the issue most frequently
presented seems to be whether the legislature has chosen to regulate
the party, not whether it has the power to do S0.41
While the erosion of the preferred position of political parties was
being completed, a more general concept of freedom of association,
rooted in the first amendment, began to appear in judicial opinions.
Although it has developed most fully as a protection for pressure groups
such as the NAACP, 42 freedom of association includes the right to
join and manage a political party.43 Recent Supreme Court cases on
freedom of association dealing specifically with political parties may
help to establish criteria for testing the constitutionality of state laws
concerning delegate selection.
The Communist Party cases, for example, point out that this
freedom is not in any sense absolute. In Gerende v. Board of Super-
visors of Elections,44 the Supreme Court upheld a Maryland statute
that excluded from the ballot candidates who refused to take an oath
against forcible or violent overthrow of the government and knowing
ment of one percent of previous total vote not unreasonable for ballot position for party
candidate); DeWalt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. 529, 24 A. 185 (1892) (three percent requirement
for other than regular nominees not unreasonable); Ransom v. Black, 54 N.J.L. 446, 24
A. 489 (1892) (five percent requirement not unreasonable); see Starr, supra note 11, at 446;
Note, Limitations on Access to the General Election Ballot, 37 CoLum. L. Rlv. 86, 90
(1937).
40 E.g., State ex rel. Nordin v. Erickson, 119 Minn. 152, 156, 137 N.W. 385, 386
(1912) (regulation upheld as "necessary to secure a pure and orderly election . . . [free
from] unfair combinations, undue influence, and coercion . . . . ); State ex rel. McCarthy
v. Moore, 87 Minn. 808, 311, 92 N.W. 4, 5 (1902) (regulation of parties necessary to pro-
tect voters against "the corrupt control by party managers of caucuses and conventions
... .'); People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic Gen. Comm., 164 N.Y. 335, 340, 58 N.E. 124,
125 (1900) (regulation upheld as necessary to make "snap caucuses impossible, and the
selection of delegates by brute force extremely difficult. . . .'); see R. HoRN, supra note
32, at 96; Mitau, The Status of Political Party Organization in Minnesota Law, 40 MINN.
L R rv. 561, 576-78 (1956).
41 E.g., Alexander v. Booth, 56 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1952); Democratic-Farmer-Labor
State Cent. Comm. v. Holm, 227 Minn. 52, 33 N.W.2d 831 (1948); Leichter v. Prender-
gast, 32 Misc. 2d 234, 223 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Carter v. Tomlinson, 149 Tex. 7,
227 S.W.2d 795 (1950).
42 It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advance-
ment of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). See H. KALVEN, JR., Tn
NEGRO AND THE Fnr AMENmnm_ 65-121 (1965).
43 Cases discussed at text accompanying notes 44-68 infra.
44 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
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membership in organizations advocating such activity. In Scales v.
United States,45 the Court held that criminal prosecution for know-
ing membership in the Communist Party was constitutionally valid,
for it "does not cut deeper into the freedom of association than is
necessary to deal with the 'substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent.' "46
The legislative power to limit individual political activity and
to restrict potential sources of financial contributions open to political
parties was challenged in two labor relations cases. United Public
Workers v. Mitchell47 upheld the Hatch Act prohibition of all partisan
political activity by federal civil service employees.48 The Court found
that the individual's freedom of political association was protected
somewhere in the first, ninth, or tenth amendments, 49 but then applied
a balancing test and found that the government's legitimate interest
in maintaining an efficient bureaucracy justified the limitations.0 Jus-
tices Black and Douglas, in dissent, however, pointed out that the issue
rested solely on the first amendment.51
United States v. C10 52 involved the constitutionality of the Taft-
Hartley amendment to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, forbidding
political contributions and expenditures by labor unions,53 which the
defendants argued violated the first, ninth, and tenth amendments.8 4
The district court found that the law unjustifiably abridged first
amendment freedoms,58 but the Supreme Court construed the claimed
violation out of the statute.5 6 A concurring opinion by Justice Rut-
45 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
46 Id. at 229, quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Accord, Com-
munist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 90-91
(1961) (on balance of "constitutionally protected right of association" against "value to
the public of the ends which the regulation may achieve," registration and disclosure pro-
visions of Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 US.C. §§ 784-87 (1964), held valid); Communist
Party of the United States v. Peek, 20 Cal. 2d 536, 551, 127 P.2d 889, 898 (1942) (law in
question void for vagueness, but state has the power to exclude political parties advocating
the unlawful overthrow of the government from ballot position).
47 330 US. 75 (1947).
48 18 U.S.C. §-595 (1964).
49 330 U.S. at 95.
50 Id. at 96-104.
51 Id. at 110-11, 124-26.
52 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
53 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 159
(1947), amending Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, § 313, 43 Stat. 1074 (re-
pealed 1948).
64 335 US. at 109.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 110-24. The Court determined that the placing of a political advertisement
by the union in a union newspaper was not an "expenditure" prohibited by the Act.
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ledge, in which three other members of the Court joined, concluded,
however, that the law was an unconstitutional restriction of associa-
tional rights protected by the first amendment, particularly freedom
of assembly.57 Rutledge asserted that both the objectives of the law
and the means it adopted to obtain them were relevant in determining
its constitutionality. One objective of this law was to reduce the influ-
ence of unions on the electoral process. This, Rutledge indicated, was
an illegitimate objective for government; i.e., if the law sought to ac-
complish nothing else it would fail as an unjustifiable infringement
on the association's right to participate in the political process and ex-
press the collective opinion of its members.58 A second objective of
the statute was to protect union members from being forced to support
political activities they opposed. Although conceding that protecting
an individual's right to dissent was a legitimate government objective,
Rutledge pointed out that less drastic means were available for achiev-
ing it.59
The most recent Court pronouncements on the law of political
association grew out of the 1968 third party campaign of George
Wallace. Williams v. Rhodes60 represents the successful culmination of
Wallace's efforts to have the American Independent Party qualified on
the ballot in all fifty states. At issue were Ohio election laws for quali-
fying new political parties for ballot positions, which required the
maintenance of an elaborate party structure and the filing of petitions
signed by fifteen percent of the electorate nine months before the elec-
tion.61 The Court, finding the political question doctrine inapplicable,
held that the state's power to designate presidential electors62 was sub-
ject to the limitations on state action imposed by the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.6 3 The Court then jumped from
57 Id. at 143-44, 153.
58 Id. at 143-45.
59 If merely "minority or dissenter protection" were intended, it would be suffi-
cient for securing this to permit the dissenting members to carry the burden of
making known their position and to relieve them of any duty to pay dues or
portions of them to be applied to the forbidden uses without jeopardy to their
rights as members.
Id. at 149. See also R. HoaN, supra note 32, at 114-17. For a discussion of freedom of
association in other labor cases, see Comment, Freedom from Political Association: The
Street and Lathrop Decisions, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 777 (1962).
60 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
61 Id. at 25 n.1. One of Ohio's requirements for access to the ballot as a political
party was that the party elect delegates and alternates to a national convention in the
state primary. Id.
62 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
83 393 U.S. at 29.
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equal protection to freedom of association as protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments, and, balancing freedom of association against
a "compelling state interest," concluded that "the totality of the Ohio
restrictive laws taken as a whole imposes a burden on voting and asso-
ciational rights which we hold to be an invidious discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause."64
This opinion at least indicates that its strict-constructionist author,
Justice Black, agreed that political parties may be protected from state
regulation by the first amendment guarantee of freedom of association.
Furthermore, two concurring opinions considered the relevant issue to
be freedom of association as controlled by the first amendment.65
It appears from these cases that political parties are protected
against statutory regulation of their affairs by a constitutional right
of freedom of association. Included in this right is the freedom of indi-
viduals "to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
64 Id. at 30-34. Justice Black, the author of the majority opinion, has never fully
accepted a constitutional right of freedom of association as part of the first amendment.
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YAL L.J. 1, 14-15 (1964).
It is quite unlikely, therefore, that the champion of the absolutists was adopting a bal-
ancing approach to the first amendment. Instead, he seemed to be saying that the right
of freedom of association could be defined by the use of the Court's balancing test and
that it was Ohio's unequal distribution of this quasi-first amendment right to Republi-
cans and Democrats but not to Wallace supporters that was "invidious discrimination"
in violation of the equal protection clause. Cf. 30 OHIo ST. LJ. 208, 207-09 (1969).
65 The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by reason of the Four-
teenth Amendment, lies at the root of these cases. The right of association is
one form of "orderly group activity" . . . protected by the First Amendment.
393 U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J., concurring), quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
I would rest this decision entirely on the proposition that Ohio's statutory
scheme violates the basic right of political association assured by the First
Amendment which is protected against state infringement under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
393 U.S. at 41 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Douglas went on to adopt the absolutist approach to this first amendment right,
stating that "the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to
be done in this field." Id. at 40, citing Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting).
Harlan accepted the results of the Court's "compelling state interest" balance and
pointed out that even if the state had a substantial interest in maintaining majority
rather than plurality government, a "substantial variety of less restrictive alternatives"
than institutionalizing a two-party system were available. 393 U.S. at 46 n.8.
In dissent, Justice Stewart applied the compelling state interest standard, but he
concluded that the state's interest was rather substantial and the infringement of associa-
tional rights rather insignificant. Id. at 60. Chief Justice Warren and Justice White also
dissented, the Chief Justice pointing to the lack of time for adequate deliberation:
"I think it is fair to say that the ramifications of our decision today may be comparable
to those of Baker v. Carr ... a case we deliberated for nearly a year." Id. at 63.
19701
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ideas"66 and its corollary, the freedom of associations to express their
"bloc sentiment"' 7 and regulate their internal affairs. At the same
time, it is clear that this right is not absolute but subject to reasonable
regulation and limitation by government. The reasonableness of such
regulation is judicially determined by a first amendment balancing test,
in which such terms as "compelling interests," "too broadly drawn,"
"overbreadth," and "less drastic means" become relevant."
The cases imply that the constitutionality of statutory infringe-
ments on freedom of political association may be determined by a three-
step inquiry. First, it must be asked whether the state's interests in the
regulation are legitimate, or, in other words, whether they are interests
that government may pursue. If they are not, as, for example, a state's
interests in disenfranchising a racial minority are not, the inquiry ends
and the law is clearly unconstitutional. If the state's interests are legit-
imate, then it must be determined whether they are "compelling" or
"substantial" when weighed against the infringement of associational
freedoms that they cause. This is the most difficult part of the test to
apply, and it is here that precedent affords the least guidance. Each
regulation must be judged on its own facts and surrounding circum-
stances; in Mitchell the government's interest in a non-political bureau-
cracy was sufficiently substantial, while in Williams the state's interests
in shortening the ballot and assuring majority rule were not. Finally,
if these two obstacles are overcome, the alternatives available to the
state must be considered. If the government's legitimate and compelling
interests might be served by a narrower infringement of the freedom of
political association, the law must fail. Although the Court has never
explicitly outlined such steps in its decision-making process, those
cases on freedom of association involving political parties indicate that
such a test will be useful in determining the constitutionality of state
laws that regulate political activity.
CONCLUSION
Thirty-six states have laws affecting the selection of delegates to
the national nominating conventions of political parties. 9 These laws
66 393 U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J., concurring), quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Pat-
terson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
67 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
68 For two recent compilations of the various balancing standards used in freedom
of association cases, see Note, Judicial Rewriting of Overbroad Statutes: Protecting the
Freedom of Association from Scales to Robel, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 240 (1969); Note, Less
Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YAu L.J. 464 (1969).
69 Binkerd, Summary to NATIONAL MuNIcIPAL LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 1.
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determine with varying degrees of precision how the party delegates
are chosen,7 0 and it is probably fair to assume that they are in large
measure responsible for the undemocratic procedures that prevail.71
Even in states that require some or all delegates to be directly elected,
the existing laws may impede an effective popular choice by preventing
the delegates' presidential candidate preference from appearing on the
ballot.72 Where the delegates must be chosen by a state convention or
party executive committee, the laws may require this body to be elected
as much as two years before the national convention. 73 The statutes
frequently require that delegates be selected indirectly by a process
three or four steps removed from popular control.74
To test the constitutionality of these laws would require that each
one be examined separately. It is clear, however, that few, if any, would
be able to withstand an attack based on freedom of political association
by a party seeking to democratize itself.75 It is difficult to conceive of a
legitimate state interest, for example, in preventing the candidate pref-
erence of delegates from appearing on the ballot or requiring that
delegates be chosen by a party committee elected two years before the
national convention.76 It seems that the state's interest in an orderly
selection procedure could be adequately served by allowing the parties
to select delegates in a primary rather than at a series of caucuses and
conventions.77
70 All delegates to the national conventions are selected by direct election in only
10 states. In four states the district delegates are elected directly but the at-large delegates
are chosen by the state party executive committee or convention. In the remaining 86
states, delegates are selected by state committees or conventions, local caucuses, or some
combination of the two. Id.; see Note, supra note 4, at 487-88.
71 See Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 3, at 1447.
72 See, e.g., N.Y. ELErMoN LAw § 108 (McKinney 1964) (form of ballot).
73 See A. Bicmr, supra note I, at 24; note 8 supra.
74 For example, in Texas all party members may participate in precinct caucuses.
The precinct caucus elects one delegate to the county convention for every 25 votes cast
in the precinct for the party's gubernatorial nominee in the last election. The county
convention elects one delegate to the state convention for every 300 to 600 votes cast in
the county in the last election for the gubernatorial nominee, and the state convention
elects the delegates to the national convention. TEx. ELECrnON CODE ANN. art. 13.34
(Supp. 1970). See also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-6-5 (1965).
75 One of the inherent advantages in the balancing test from the reformers' point
of view is that it frees a party seeking to democratize itself from the restrictions imposed
by state law but does not free a party establishment trying to make its internal proce-
dure less democratic. A state may have a legitimate and compelling interest in ensuring
that the parties are representative of the people, and it is probably justified in estab-
lishing a base of democratic participation below which the parties may not go.
76 Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 28 (1968); Communist Party of the United States
v. Peek, 20 Cal. 2d 526, 553-54, 127 P.2d 889, 899-900 (1942) (requirement that a new party
demonstrate popular support two years before election to obtain ballot position held
constitutionally invalid).
77 The state's interest would be especially insignificant if the parties financed the
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The significance of the minority report of the Rules Committee
adopted by the 1968 Democratic National Convention lies in its rejec-
tion of the idea that the manner of selecting delegates must be left to
state parties and legislatures.7 8 The Commission on Party Structure and
Delegate Selection should not establish non-conforming state laws as
an excuse for non-compliance with the report until those laws have
been judicially weighed against the freedom of association.
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primary election themselves as they normally do in a number of states. See, e.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-449.10 (1962); ci. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 72(b) (1957). See also Bunting
v. Board of Canvassers & Registration, 90 R.I. 63, 153 A.2d 560 (1958) (state law so con-
strued that party may disregard established primary procedure and choose its nominees
as it wishes).
78 Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 3, at 1456.
